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Abstract
The central purpose of this paper is to introduce a new political
economy explanation to modern Social Security Systems. This ap-
proach is based on the Single-Mindedness Theory (SMT), which as-
sumes that the more single-minded groups are able to exert a greater
power of influence on Governments (and eventually obtain what they
require) than those groups which dissipate their mindedness on sev-
eral issues. Governments are considered as voting-maximizer policy-
makers, whose unique goal is winning elections. Using an OLG model
and a probabilistic voting approach, I will analyse a society divided
into two groups, the old and the young, which only differ for their
preferences for leisure. I will show that, in order to win elections, the
Government sets the optimal policy vector taking into account pref-
erences for leisure of both groups; eventually, the old obtain a lower
effective marginal tax rate and retire earlier, so that they can spend all
their time in leisure, a fraction of which is used to undertake political
activities whose aim is the capture of politicians.
JEL Classification: D31, D72, J22, J26
Keywords: probabilistic voting model, single-mindedness, social secu-
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We work in order to have leisure (Aristotle)
1 Introduction
The stylized facts which refer to the workers’ behavior in the U.S. labour
market show that the participation to the labour force of the older persons
has been increasingly declining over the last century. If the labour force par-
ticipation of men age 65-69 was around 60% in the 50’s, the same figure had
fallen to 26% in the 90’s [16]. In many OECD countries, workers withdraw
from the labour market well before the official retirement age. Eventually,
this long-term decline associated with an increase in the life expectation
has led to a considerable increase in the retirement years. Otherwise, the
Government expenditure for Social Security has been skyrocketing and so
has been the percentage of workers covered by the System. This situation
runs into risk to become financially unsustainable over the next years, unless
Governments undertake the structural reforms of Social Security Systems as
suggested by many economists (see Feldstein & Liebman [19] amongst the
others).
Over the last few years, the economic literature has been trying to give
plausible explanations to this strong change in the old workers’ lifestyle.
According to an OECD survey [39] financial incentives embedded into pub-
lic pensions and other assistance schemes pull old workers into retirement.
Nevertheless, the OECD makes a distinction between pull factors of retire-
ment and the push factors of retirement. The former include all of those
financial benefits that incentive workers to anticipate their retirement age,
whilst the latter refer to negative perceptions by old workers about their
capacity or productivity and to socio-demographic characteristics.
In this paper I take the distance from the OECD’s vision, which considers
financial benefits as a pull factor to reduce the amount of work. Otherwise,
in accordance with the SMT, I suggest that preferences of workers (espe-
cially the old) for leisure shape the characteristics of modern Social Security
Systems. Thus, behind the generosity of the transfers by Governments there
is a precise political mechanism, driven by individuals who use their power
of influence over the Government to obtain what they need to finance their
leisure.
I use an OLG model which considers a society divided into two groups
of workers: the old and the young. Furthermore, I assume that there is a
political competition amongst two parties, which aim to maximize the share
of votes and must choose an optimal policy vector which encompasses the
effective marginal tax rates on labour.
The core assumption of the model is based on the idea of “single-mindedness”,
defined as the ability of a social group to be more focused on a single issue
rather than many. The idea was introduced by Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin
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[37] who assumed that the old have more needs for leisure than the young
and this necessity would explain why the the old require (and eventually
obtain) generous transfers by the Government and why the Social Security
expenditures in the U.S. have been increased so much over the last decades.
They adopted an OLG model with a society divided into old and young
workers and showed that
retired elderly can concentrate on issue that relate only to their
age such as the pension or the health system
while the young have to choose among
age-related and occupation issues
Eventually, they concluded,
the elderly are politically powerful because they are more single-
minded and (. . . ) more single-minded groups tend to vote for
larger social security programs that benefit them
Thus, according to this theory, there would exist in the economy a group,
the old workers, which has a sort of political superpower which enables it to
dictate the optimal taxation (a sort of tyranny of the elder or “Gerontoc-
racy”, to quote the author).
Indeed, neither Demographics nor the need for an assistance would ex-
plain the skyrocketing increase in the Governments’ expenditure for Social
Security Systems and the broad reduction in retirement age over the last
decades, but preferences of the old for leisure would provide a more suit-
able explanation to this upward trend. In a recent work, Diamond [16],
attempting to describe the linkage between the Social Security System and
the retirement in the U.S., wrote in his conclusions:
there is clear evidence from both previous work (. . . ) that the
broad structure of the SS program influences retirement timing.
Evidence on the effects of variation in the benefits provided by
this program is less clear, however.
Over the recent years, economists like Profeta [40] and Mulligan & Sala-
i-Martin [34] have attempted to formalize models involving the SMT but
they all seem to be affected by a fundamental problem due to the use of
lump sum transfers amongst cohorts; in Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin “an in-
terest group may tax its members with a labour income tax and distribute
the proceeds to them in a lump sum fashion”; Profeta used a lump sum
system to transfer wealth both within the cohort and amongst different co-
horts. Finally, also Linbeck and Weibull [32] study a redistributive model
with political competition where gross incomes are fixed and known and,
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hence, “first-best (individual) lump-sum redistributions are in principle fea-
sible”. Their model represent a remarkable application in economic theory
of Hinich [25] studies on multi-dimensionality of policy space and the first
step to overcome the limitations that previous analysis suffered due to the
use of very restrictive instruments such as the Median Voter Theorem. Nev-
ertheless, the redistributive system these models take into account, with
lump-sum taxation, does not seem to exist in the real world. For instance,
Diamond found out that “The Social Security system in the U.S. today is
financed by a payroll tax which is levied on workers and firms equally”,
whilst Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, adopting a cross-section analysis of 89
countries, discovered that the 96% of Social Security Programs are financed
with payroll taxes.
In this paper I will assume, unlike the previous models, that the inter-
generational transfer do not take place via lump-sum taxes, but via a more
realistic taxation on labour income. In particular, I will assume that the
Government has to decide how to divide the revenues generated by the tax-
ation of the two groups. Eventually, I will demonstrate that the old obtain a
higher tax credit (or a reduction of the effective marginal tax rate) than the
young and that they get a higher level of leisure; a situation which is con-
sistent with the old needs, since their preferences are more oriented toward
leisure than toward work.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the basic model;
section 3 presents a discussion of the numerical simulations; section 4 pro-
vides a variation of the model encompassing altruism, section 5 provides
some empirical evidence and section 6 concludes.
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2 The basic model
I consider an OLG model, where each generation lives only for two periods,
the youth and old age (see Figure 1).
[FIGURE 1 HERE].
At any period of time, the generation of youths coexists with the genera-
tion of the elderly. At the beginning of the next period, the elderly die,
the youths become elderly and a new generation of youths is born. As a
consequence, there are two overlapping generations of people living at any
one time. Generations are unlinked, meaning that there is no possibility to
leave any bequest. Individuals consume all the available income earned at
a given period of time; thus, it is not possible neither to save nor to borrow
money.
Then, at time t, let a population of size one be partitioned into two
groups of workers, the young, representing the generation born at time t
and denoted by T , and the old, representing the generation born at time
t − 1 and who denoted by T − 1. I will use capital letters to indicate the
group and small letters to indicate single individuals belonging to a group.
The size of a group does not change over time.
Each worker has to decide how to divide his total amount of time t
between work and leisure (denoted by l). If the level of leisure reach 100%,
I assume that the worker retires and gets a benefit equal to pτ−1t . I assume
also that leisure is employed to attend several activities, such as relaxing,
taking care of family, taking part in political activities and many others.
Thus, leisure can be seen as a vector of N activities l = l(l1, l2, ..., lN ),
where ln ≥ 0.
Furthermore, I introduce the core assumptions of the model. I assume
that the old and the young are identical in every respect except one: the
intrinsic value of the old workers for leisure is assumed to be strictly greater
than the same value of the young workers. That is, ψτ−1 >> ψτ , where
Greek letter psi denotes the intrinsic value for leisure. Thus, the two social
groups have different preferences with respect to the choice between work
and leisure.
This assumption is supported by the empirical evidence. The economic
science has produced many works which provide possible explanations to the
existence of a difference in preferences for leisure. Moreover, over the last
years, other social sciences like Sociology and Psychology have added some
very useful contributions. This is why I will distinguish the economic reasons
from the non-economic reasons. The economic reasons are summarized in a
work by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999).
• Differences in labour productivity. Since labour productivity is de-
clining in age, the old are less productive than the young and, as a
consequence, they earn a lower wage. This idea would explain the
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willingness by the old to retire: less productive workers in the labour
market find profitable to devote relatively more of their time and effort
to the political sector as to gain benefits that they would not get if
they relied only on the labour market. Nevertheless, for the theory to
hold it is necessary to assume that leisure devoted to political activ-
ities is a normal good. That is, an increase in the total leisure time
entails an increase in leisure devoted to political activities, due to the
income effect2.
• Differences in human capital accumulation. The young are more en-
gaged in self-financed human capital accumulation while they work
than the old. As a consequence, the value of time for the young may
be higher than their average hourly wage (see Stafford and Duncan
[44]).
• Long-term employment contracts. The empirical evidence shows that
due to the Lazear-type contracts, labour productivity for workers aged
60+ is significantly lower than wages.
As for the non-economic reasons, I refer to a work by Hershey, Henkens
and Van Dalen [24]. In comparing the Dutch with the U.S. Social Secu-
rity System, the authors discovered that “the Americans had significantly
longer future time perspectives, higher level of retirement goal clarity and
they tended to be more engaged in retirement planning activities”. Thus,
these findings are able to explain the existence of socio-cultural differences
in the preferences for retirement. They go on affirming that “American
workers think, prepare and save more for retirement... beginning in early
adulthood”, focalizing on the difference among societies, where there exists
a major difference in financial responsibility, different level of uncertainty for
future pension payouts and different psychological pressures. Finally, in con-
cluding that the success of political initiatives depends in part on “changing
the dimensions of the psyche that motivate individuals to adaptively pre-
pare for old age”, they implicitly recognize that preferences of individuals
for leisure may endogenously change over time, again due to cultural and
psychological motivations.
Old workers’ preferences can be represented by a quasi-linear utility func-
tion3. A representative young worker at time t has the following lifetime
utility function:
U τ−1 = cτ−1t + ψ
τ−1 log lτ−1t (1)
∀ τ − 1 ∈ T − 1
2For a general theory on the allocation of political time, see Canegrati [9]
3A quasi-linear utility function entails the non existence of the income effect
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where cτ−1t is consumption at time t, l
τ−1
t is leisure at time t and ψ
τ−1
is a parameter representing the intrinsic preference of the old worker for
leisure (ψτ−1 ∈ [0, 1]).
The old worker consumes all his income:
cτ−1t = (w
τ−1(1− τL) + aτ−1t τL)(t− lτ−1t ) (2)
where wτ−1 is the unitary wage per hour worked, τL is the tax rate on
labour income (equal for every group and constant over time) and aτ−1t the
tax credit.
Similarly, the preferences of a representative young worker τ are given
by the following lifetime utility function:
U τ = cτt + ψ
τ log lτt + β(c
τ
t+1 + ψ
τ log lτt+1) (3)
∀τ ∈ T
where cτt and c
τ
t+1 represent consumption at time t and t+1, l
τ
t and l
τ
t+1
leisure at time t and t + 1, and ψτ is the intrinsic preference of the young
worker for leisure (ψτ ∈ [0, 1]). Since the young know that at time t+1 will
be old, their utility function includes the leisure of the next period, weighted
by a discount factor β ∈ [0, 1].
The young worker’s inter temporal budget constraint is given by:
cτt + βc
τ
t+1 = (w
τ
t (1− τL) + aτt τL)(t− lτt )
+β((wτt+1(1− τL) + aτt+1τL)(t− lτt+1)) (4)
2.1 The Government
The literature has used different formulations for the Government’s objective
function. A typical normative approach considers a benevolent Government
which aims to maximize a Social Utility Function by choosing the optimal
tax rate on labour, subject to a budget constraint where tax revenues are
equal to public expenditures. Otherwise, some authors such as Edwards and
Keen consider a Leviathan model where, referring to the famous milestone
paper by Brennan and Buchanan [8], they examine a Government which is
in part concerned with maximizing the size of the public sector. Further-
more, the Edwards and Keen model assumes that the Government retains
some degree of benevolence, perhaps because it has re-election concerns.
Nevertheless, these concerns were not formally modeled. In this paper, I
provide a possible explanation to this issue, introducing a political economy
model where politicians act in order to maximize the probability of being
re-elected. The policy vector the Government has to choose is given by:
~q = (aτ−1, aτ )
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encompassing the two tax credits.
Furthermore, I introduce the budget constraints of the Government:
nτ−1τL(t− lτ−1t )(wτ−1t − aτ−1t ) + nττL(t− lτt )(wτt − aτt ) = 0 (5)
where nτ−1τL(t− lτ−1t )(wτ−1t −aτ−1t ) represents total revenues generated
by the taxation of the old at time t, whilst nττL(t − lτt )(wτt − aτt ) the total
revenues generated by the taxation of the young.
Since revenues are proportional to the amount of labour supplied, the
taxation entails inefficiencies, since it distorts workers’ decisions on the
amount of labour supplied. I also assume that a contingent budget sur-
plus is entirely used to pay pensions to the retirees.
As suggested by Lindbeck and Weibull, I assume the existence of a
balanced-budget redistribution where the government cannot redistribute more
money than is available in the economy, and cannot use tax revenues for
any purpose other than redistribution so that the condition nτ−1τL(t −
lτ−1t )(w
τ−1
t − aτ−1t ) + nττL(t− lτt )(wτt − aτt ) = 0 says that the revenues ob-
tained via labour taxation are used to redistribute wealth amongst cohorts.
To avoid the case in which a difference in wage levels is the solely respon-
sible for the existence of retirement I impose that wages are exogenously
determined: wτ−1t = wτt = w. Furthermore, without loss of generality, I
normalize the wage rate to the unity.
2.2 The Density Function in a Probabilistic Voting Model
with Single-Mindedness
2.2.1 The Lindbeck & Weibull framework
As in Lindbeck and Weibull the component of every voter’s welfare depends
on fiscal policies chosen by candidates which affect his consumption and
which is known by both parties, whilst the other component of welfare,
which derives from personal attributes of the candidates, is only imperfectly
observed by the parties. In other words, we are assuming that consumers’
preferences for consumption are perfectly visible, whilst other political as-
pects such as ideology are not (Linbeck & Weibull’s stochastic heterogene-
ity). The presence of uncertainty is fundamental for the existence of an
equilibrium, since in the absence of this assumption, candidates would be
able to perfectly observe workers’ preferences and then we would have a
discontinuous function. In such a case, no equilibrium would exist, for any
policy suggested by a candidate would be beaten by another policy. Indeed,
suppose that overall preferences of voter i ∈ I may be written as:
U i = V i(~q) + piA(ξi + ζ)
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where piA = 1 if candidate A wins elections and piA = 0 if he loses them.
The term ζ reflects the candidate A’s general popularity amongst the elec-
torate. It is not idiosyncratic and it is uniformly distributed on the interval
(− 12h , 12h) with mean zero and density h. Hence, the voter’s choice is deter-
ministic, and it is a discontinuous function of the utility differential between
the two party vector of policies. Otherwise, the term ξi represents an id-
iosyncratic component of voter’s preferences for candidate A and, assuming
that it cannot be exactly observed by parties and that voters are uniformly
distributed on (− 1
2sI
, 1
2sI
), again with mean zero and density sI . Thus, each
voter in group I votes for candidate A if and only if the candidate A’s pol-
icy vector provides him with a greater utility than that provided by the
candidate B’s policy vector. That is:
V i(~qA) + ζ + ξi > V i(~qB) (6)
The assumption that voters care not only about transfers but also have
unobserved exogenous preferences for one candidate assure the existence
of a Nash equilibrium to the electoral-competition in a multi-dimensional
model, according to Lindbeck & Weibull and Dixit & Londregan [17]. The
traditional social choice theory states a negative result when affirms that
any division of resources among cohorts can be beaten in a pairwise vote by
some other division. The existence of preferences with respect to policies
over which the parties cannot easily change position from election to election,
or evaluations of parties with respect to characteristics such as honesty and
leadership which are valued by all voters (the so called valence issues) rules
out the non-existence of an equilibrium.
2.2.2 The role of swing voters
In each social group there are some swing voters, who are those individuals
that do not have any particular preference for one of the two candidates.
This category of voters is fundamental to evaluate the effect of a change
in the equilibrium policy vector. In fact, suppose to start from a situation
of equilibrium, where the candidate A’s policy, ~qA is exactly equal to the
candidate B’s policy, ~qB; a candidate knows that, should it deviate from
that policy some swing voters will be better off (and vote for him) whilst
some other will be worse off (and vote against him). Thus, in choosing a
policy, a candidate should calculate the number of swing voters which he
would gain and compare it with the number of swing voters he would lose;
intuitively, a change in a policy should be made if and only if a candidate
evaluates that the number of swing voters gained is greater than the number
of swing voters lost. Swing voters in group I are identified by the following
expression:
ξi = V i(~qB)− V i(~qA)− ζ (7)
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This expression affirms that a swing voter is indifferent between candi-
date A and candidate B; otherwise, all the voters with ξjI < ξI vote for
candidate B and all the voters with ξjI > ξI vote for candidate A. I indicate
the share of votes of candidate A in group I with:
piA =
∑
I
nIsI [ξi +
1
2sI
] (8)
and substituting (7) into (8) I obtain:
piA =
h
s
∑
I
nIsI [V i(~qB)− V i(~qA)− ζ] + 1
2
(9)
where s ≡ nIsI . Notice that piA is a random variable since it depends on ζ
which is also random. Thus, the candidate A’s probability of winning is:
A
Pr = Pr[piA ≥ 1
2
] = Pr[
h
s
∑
I
nIsI [V i(~qB)− V i(~qA)− ζ] + 1
2
≥ 1
2
]
and rearranging the terms I obtain:
A
Pr = Pr[piA ≥ 1
2
] = Pr[
h
s
∑
I
nIsI [V i(~qB)− V i(~qA)] ≥
∑
I
nIsIζ]
Similarly, candidate B wins with probability PrB = 1−PrA. In this model,
the probability of winning is thus a function of the distance between the two
electoral platforms.
Definition 1 A pair (qA∗, qB∗) is called a (pure strategy) Nash equilib-
rium (NE) in the expected-plurality game if E(piA − piB|qA, qB∗) ≤ E(piA −
piB|qA∗, qB∗) ≤ E(piA∗ − piB|qA, qB) for all qA, qB which satisfy the budget
constraint.
2.2.3 An endogenous density function
The core assumption of a Single-Mindedness model affirms that the density
function which depicts the distribution of preferences of social groups for
political parties is endogenously determined and depends on some issues.
In other words, it must be the case where over a single issue, different
social groups have different preferences for political parties. In this model
the issue is represented by leisure. I assume that on this issue the two
social groups have different visions and preferences for the parties A,B. For
instance, the old may have a ticker distribution function of preferences than
the young. A greater level of Single-Mindedness entails higher values of
the density function which, in this case, tends to assume a ticker shape.
From a statistical point of view, a more single-minded group should have
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a distribution with higher levels of Kurtosis, with respect to a less single-
minded groups. That is the distribution is more “leptokurtic ”4. Figure 2
shows an example of different distributions in a two-issue problem. There
are two groups (red and orange), and two issues (x and y).
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
The figure shows how the distributions of the two groups depend on the
issue and that the red group has a ticker distribution for both the two
issues, that is more single-minded. In this simple case the distribution is
uniform in a closed interval. The broadness of the interval (− 1
2sI
, 1
2sI
) is
endogenously determined: since s is a monotonically increasing function
of the two issues, higher level of the issues increase s and thus reduce the
broadness of the interval. As a result we have an higher level of concentration
of the swing voters around the parameter ζ. Summarizing the previous
concept in a formula, I write the endogenous density function of leisure in a
Single-Mindedness model as:
sI = s(lI) (10)
2.3 The allocation of time amongst different activities
Another core assumption of the model is that social groups devote a fraction
of their time to political activities and that the higher the amount of leisure
spent in political activities, the higher the probability the group is able
to capture politicians and, as a consequence, the higher the probability
of being successful. The main idea that individuals allocate time between
different activities dates back to Gary Becker’s works ([6]) where households
are seen both as consumers and as producers and the amount of activities
undertaken are determined by maximising a utility function subject to prices
and constraints on resources. The great idea by Becker was considering that
consumption activities full cost is equal to the sum of market prices and the
forgone value of the time used up. Thus, a representative consumer solves
the following maximization problem:
maxU = U(li, ..., ln) = Z(x1, ..., xn;T1, ..., Tn)
subject to
g(l1, ..., ln) = l
where g is an expenditure function of li and l is the bound on resources.
The goods constraint is:
n∑
i=1
pixi = I = V + Tww¯ (11)
4Examples of leptokurtic distributions include the Laplace distribution and the logistic
distribution
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where pi is a vector of unit prices, Tw is a vector of hours spent in working
and w¯ is the wage rate per unit of Tw. We have also a time constraint which
can be written as:
n∑
i=1
Ti = Tc = T − Tw (12)
In other words the total available time T may be seen as the sum of total
time devoted to work Tw and total time devoted to consumption activities
Tc which is the sum of time devoted to single consumption activities Ti. Let
us assume now that
Ti ≡ tili (13)
xi ≡ bili (14)
where ti is a vector giving the input of time per unit of li and bi is a
similar vector for market goods. Substituting (13) into (12), (12) and (14)
into (11) we obtain:
n∑
i=1
(pibi + tiw¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pii
li = V + Tw¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
(15)
pii represents the sum of the unitary prices of the goods and of the time
spent for li. Let us now denote the full income (the maximum money income
achievable) by S; this can be seen as the sum of the total labour earnings
I and the total earnings forgone in devoting time to consumption activities
L. Thus:
L(l1, ..., ln) ≡ S − I(l1, ..., ln)
which can also be re-written as:
n∑
i=1
pibili + L(l1, ..., ln) ≡ S (16)
The equilibrium conditions resulting from maximising the utility func-
tion subject to (16) are:
Ui = T (pibi + Li) (17)
where pibi is the direct and Li the indirect component of the total marginal
price pibi + Li.
Describing more in details the basic elements of the workers’ decision
problem in this model, I assume that leisure is a vector ~l of N activities
which can be undertaken in the spare time (indexed by n = 1, ..., N). One
of these activities is lobbying politicians, which I will denote with lp. In
order to undertake such an activity some inputs such as knowledge of polit-
ical situation, telephone calls and time are required. Suppose now to denote
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all the other consumption activities apart from lobbying with l−p. Figure 3
shows a situation of equilibrium (denoted with k), where the slope of the full
income opportunity curve, which is equal to the marginal prices and would
be equal to slope of an indifference curve (equals to marginal utilities).
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
If we analyse the problem from a microeconomic perspective, the con-
sumption set of activities that can be undertaken may be written as: L =
<N+ = l ∈ <N : ln ≥ 0 for n=1,...,N where L is convex set. Each activity can
be written as:
li = fi(xi, Ti) (18)
where xi is a vector of inputs which are necessary for an activity to be
undertaken and Ti a vector of time inputs using in performing the activity.
The partial derivatives of li with respect to both xi and Ti are non-negative,
that is ∂li∂xi ≥ 0 and
∂li
∂Ti
≥ 0.
If we look at leisure as a vector of activities, then (10) may be written
as:
~s = s(~l(l1, l2, ..., lN )) (19)
Furthermore calculating derivatives:
∂sl(l1,l2,...,lN )
∂l(l1, l2, ..., lN )
∂l(l1, l2, ..., lN )
∂ln
> 0 (20)
Equation (20) says that the density function is monotonically increasing in
leisure devoted to political activities. By the meaning of the chain rule we
can divide the expression in two terms. The first term ∂l(l1,l2,...,lN )∂ln represents
the effect of an increase in leisure devoted to political activities on total
leisure and it is positive. Otherwise, the term ∂s
l(l1,l2,...,lN )
∂l(l1,l2,...,lN )
represents the
effect of an increase in total leisure on the density function, which represents
an indicator for the group cohesion and for the group political power. Also
this term is positive, since an increase in time devoted to political activities
is likely to increase the power of influence of a group. In this view leisure
spent by individuals in political activities can be seen as an investment in
time, whose return is represented by the benefit they get from politicians.
In turn, the endogenous density may be seen as a measure of the group’s
single-mindedness; the higher the density of the group, the higher the single-
mindedness and vice versa. This assumption would explain why those issues
or preferences that are more commonly shared by individuals are politically
more successful.
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2.4 A three-stage game
I consider a three-stage game where two candidates, say A and B, wish to
maximize their number of votes to win elections 5. Both of them have an
ideological label (for instance they are seen as “Democrats”or “Republicans
”). I assume that this label is exogenously given.
In the first stage of the game, the two candidates, simultaneously and
independently, announce (and commit to) a policy vector, ~qA and~qB.
In the second stage elections take place. A candidate wins elections if
and only if it obtains the majority of votes; in the case of a tie a coin is tossed
in order to choose the Government which will come to power. Furthermore,
I assume that each party prefers to stay out from the competition than to
enter and lose, that prefers to tie than stay out and it prefers to win than
to tie.
Finally, in the third stage, workers choose their work and leisure, given
the level of credits chosen by the Government.
2.5 The equilibrium
I solve the game by backward induction, starting from the final stage.
A representative old worker solves the following optimization problem:
maxU τ−1 = cτ−1t + ψ
τ−1 log lτ−1t
s.t. cτ−1t = ((1− τL) + aτ−1t τL)(t− lτ−1t )
Solving with respect to lτ−1t I obtain an expression for the optimal amount
of leisure:
lτ−1∗t =
ψτ−1
(1− τL) + aτ−1t τL
(21)
and substituting into (1) I obtain an expression for the Indirect Utility Func-
tion:
V τ−1t = t((1−τL)+aτ−1t τL)−ψτ−1+ψτ−1 logψτ−1−ψτ−1 log((1−τL)+aτ−1t τL)
(22)
I do the same for the representative young worker:
max U τ = cτt + ψ
τ log lτt + β(c
τ
t+1 + ψ
τ log lτt+1)
s.t. cτt+
τ
t+1 = ((1− τL) + aτt τL)(t− lτt ) + β((t− lτt+1)((1− τL) + aτt τL))
lτ∗t =
ψτ
(1− τL) + aτt τL
(23)
5Lindbeck and Weibull 1987 and Dixit and Londregan 1996 demonstrated that the
Nash equilibrium obtained if candidates maximize their vote share is identical to that
obtained when candidates maximize their probability of winning
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V τ = t((1− τL) + aτt τL)− ψτ + ψτ logψτ − ψτ log((1− τL) + aτt τL)
+aτt τL) + β(t− ψτ )((1− τL) + aτt τL) + βψτ (logψτ ) (24)
In the second stage of the game elections take place. It is easy to verify
that the elections’ outcome is a tie. The proof arises as an obvious con-
sequence of the resolution of the first stage, where it will be demonstrated
that in equilibrium, both parties choose an identical policy vector.
In the first stage, the two candidates choose their policy vectors. They
face exactly the same optimization problem and maximize their share of
votes or, equivalently, the probability of winning. The resolution is made
for candidate A, but it also holds for candidate B.
max piA =
1
2
+
h
s
∑
I={T−1,T}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)]
nτ−1τL(t− lτ−1t )(wτ−1t − aτ−1t ) + nττL(t− lτt )(wτt − aτt ) = 0
I provide a complete resolution to the problem in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium both candidates’ policy vectors converge to
the same platform; that is ~qA = ~qB = ~q∗.
Proof : ~q∗ represents the policy which captures the highest number of swing
voters. Instead, suppose there exists other two policies ~q′ and ~q′′; in moving
from ~q∗ to ~q′ (or ~q′′) a candidate loses more swing voters than those it is
able to gain. Thus, suppose a starting point where candidate A chooses ~q′
and candidate B chooses ~q′′ such that in choosing ~q′ and ~q′′ the elections
outcome is a tie. If one candidate moved toward ~q∗, it would be able to gain
more swing voters than those it loses and thus, it would win the elections.
So, choosing any policy but ~q∗ cannot be an optimal answer. The only one
policy which represents a Nash Equilibrium is ~q∗ since it is the intersection
between the optimal answers of the two candidates and no one candidate
has an incentive to deviate. Since each candidate maximizes its share of
votes, in equilibrium the two candidates receive both one half of votes; if
one candidate should receive less than one half of votes it would always have
the possibility to adopt the platform chosen by the other candidate and get
the same number of votes. Notice that what we found here is the multidi-
mensional analogue of Hotelling’s principle of minimum differentiation.
Corollary 1 The utility levels reached by workers are the same; that is:
V iA = V iB.
Proposition 2 The marginal tax rate on labour is equal for both groups but
the tax credit is more beneficial for the group of the old.
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Proof : obtained via numerical simulations. See Table 2 and 3 and 4 in
Appendix 1.
Proposition 3 Optimal allowances are a function of the numerosity and
density of both groups, of the marginal tax rate, of the total endowment of
time and of the parameters representing preferences of groups for leisure.
That is: aIt = a(s
I , s−I , nI , n−I , τL, t, ψI , ψ−I).
Proof : see Appendix 1.
Thus, the political economy framework suggests that effective tax rates
should be differentiated amongst cohorts, as Proposition 2 states. Indeed,
if a traditional and normative approach suggests that a benevolent Gov-
ernments should tax less the poorest social groups, this political economy
approach suggests that in a real world vote-seeker Governments tax groups
according to their ability to threat politicians in the electoral competition.
Proposition 4 All the old either have a positive labour supply (altough very
low) or retire, whilst the young always have a positive labour supply.
Proof : see Appendix 1.
Corollary 2 Tax revenues collected via labour taxation on the young are
positive; tax revenues generated via the labour taxation on labour taxation
on the old are negative or equal to zero in the case that all they retire.
Proof : It derives from Proposition 2 and 4.
Thus, the fiscal system described by the model, is compatible with the
decision of the old to early retire. As a consequence, revenues collected
from the taxation of the old are equal to zero, whilst revenues collected with
the taxation of the young are positive and equal to the amount of pensions
that the old receive. The fact that tax revenues are negative for the old
and positive for the young means that the old get a transfer financed with
revenues of the young.
Corollary 3 The old are more single-minded than the young. That is:
(sτ−1 > sτ ).
Proof : The result derives from the assumption that the density function is
monotonically increasing in leisure (s = s(l)). Since the old obtain more
leisure in equilibrium, the density is higher and, by definition, the group is
more single-minded.
Finally, the Lagrange multiplier has a political meaning: it represents the
increase in the probability of winning for a candidate, if it had an additional
dollar available to spend on redistribution.
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3 Numerical Simulations
Numerical simulations was made since an analytical solution for the system
is hard to compute. Indeed, to get the optimal policy vector we have to
solve a system of three equations with three unknowns (the two tax credits
and the Lagrange multiplier). Nevertheless, also this process suffers from
some problems. First of all, the simultaneity. We have assumed that the
density function is endogenous in leisure; this implies that we are able to
know the value of the density only after having calculated the optimal level
of leisure which depends on the level of taxation but which is exactly what
we want to evaluate! A possible way out for this problem is to guess a
numerical value for the density function and verify afterwords that the level
of leisure calculated is compatible with the initial guess; in other words, if
we assume that the density is monotonically increasing in leisure, we should
expect to find higher levels of leisure for the group of the old for which we
have guessed an higher density. Should not this happen, it would mean that
our guess is wrong and the SMT fails. Furthermore, we also know that in
equilibrium optimal leisure is an incrasing function of ψ. As a consequence,
the density function should be an increasing function of ψ as well. This
is why I will use a Logit Density Function of ψ as a proxy for the actual
Logit Density Function of leisure. Secondly, the value of exogenous variable
should be realistic, but unfortunately it is difficult to attribute a real value
to some parameters such as the preferences of workers for leisure and the tax
allowances should assume values between -1 and 1 which does not always
happen.
3.1 Main Findings
Main results are reported in table 4-6. Tables 4.a, 5.a and 6.a report the
matrix of inputs, whilst tables 4.b, 5.b and 6.b the matrix of outcomes.
We may see two important results: the tax credit for the old is greater
than the tax credit for the young (compare the last column of tables x.a
with the first column of tables x.b) and leisure of the old is greater than
leisure of the young (compare the second and the third columns of tables
x.b). Finally, revenues generated by the taxation of the young are always
higher than revenues generated by the taxation of the old (compare the
fourth and fifth columns of tables x.b). These results are rather obvious if
we consider that taxation of labour is the only instrument the Government
has to force workers to change their labour offer. In this case, since the
old prefer to reduce labour more than the young, the Government designs
a taxation system which entails higher fiscal benefits for them and still let
them retire to enjoy more leisure. Nevertheless, the taxation system is not
the only reason why the old offer less labour; in fact, the parameter of
preference for leisure ψ is fundamental to determine the labour supply. In
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the simulation this parameter is supposed to be greater than 12 for the old
and less than 12 for the young. It can be seen that the magnitude of tax
allowances for the old increases the lower ψτ−1. This result is not immediate
and need an explanation. Suppose a situation where both the old and the
young have exactly the same preferences for leisure; then, in equilibrium
tax credits would be the same for both the groups. Now, let us suppose
that the old are slightly more single-minded than the young but that their
preferences for leisure are not very high; that is, they still prefer to work a
discrete number of hours. Nevertheless, they are the most powerful group
in term of swing voters who may drive the election outcomes. Politicians
realize that, with such a preferences, the utility of the old depend both on
the level of leisure but also on the monetary value of work represented by
net-of-tax wage rate. As a result, they set very high tax credits for the
old in order to increase the utility of the old via an increase of the net
wage compensation. Once preferences of the old for leisure increase, they
consider less the value attached to the compensation component and, for
very high level of ψτ−1 their utility depends almost exclusivly on leisure. As
a consequence, politicians may decrease the level of tax credits for the old
and increase that level of tax credits for the young. Roughly speaking, if we
have a society where the old are very oriented towards the early retirement,
governments may allow for tax policies more beneficial for the young, since
a tax policy beneficial to the old is not necessary as this group only desire
to retire. The fact that revenues generated by the taxation on the young
are always higher that those generated by the taxation on the old (which
eventually will be equal to zero in the case of total retirement) is mainly due
to the value assumed by the parameter representative of worker preferences
for leisure. Thus, the optimal policy set by the government is such that
in equlibrium the old obtain both a gain from the taxation system and an
increase in their leisure. The burden of the entire system is borne by the
young, whose tax revenues are used to pay social security benefits to the old.
This result do not intend, obviously, to replicate exactly the right number
we may find in reality, as for tax rates, credits and so on. For instance, it
appears not realistic to adopt high tax rates or so high levels of taxation to
force all the workers to retire.
4 A model with altruism
I consider now a model where the old workers care of their offspring’s wealth.
A classical altruistic model considers that households can be represented by
a dinasty who is willing to perpetuate forever. As a consequence, the old
internalize the utility function of the young and thus the new utility function
of the old may be written as:
U τ−1 = cτ−1t + ψ
τ−1 log lτ−1t + σU
τ (25)
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∀ τ − 1 ∈ T − 1
where σ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter which captures the degree of altruism
of the old for the young; the higher σ the more the old attach a greater
importance to the young’s wealth. In Appendix 3 i will provide a complete
resolution to the problem.
Proposition 5 The introduction of altruism in the model entails higher tax
credits for the group of the young. The magnitude of this shift is higher, the
higher is σ.
Proof : see Appendix 3. As we can see by numerical simulation reported
in Appendix 3, the introduction of altruism turns previous results around.
This time the group of the young gain higher tax credits than the group of
the old which is higher the higher is the parameter representing altruism.
Furthermore, the taxation on the old is positive whilst that on the young is
negative, meaning that they get a fiscal benefit whose burden is carried by
the old. Nevertheless, the old still reach higher level of leisure. Results are
very easy to interpret: the higher the old care of the young’s welfare, the
higher they are willing to accept to carry the burden of the social security
system. This is a great achievement for the welfare of society: the old get
satisfaction both from leisure and from being generous, whilst the young get
satisfaction by working more and receiving a fiscal benefit; since Leviathan
politicians want to satisfy the electorate, they are more than happy to set
the new pro-younger policy.
5 Theory and evidence: a review
In this section I review some of the empirical evidence found in the litera-
ture which may support the SMT. I remind that if the SMT was right, we
should observe in reality high levels of retirement within the old workers ac-
companied by high marginal tax rates on labour. I will mainly focus on the
U.S. case referring to recent works by Peter Diamond (1997) and Mulligan
& Sala-i-Martin (1999).
5.1 The Unceasing Decrease in labour Market Participation
Around the World
According to Diamond, the stylized facts would show that the participa-
tion of the older persons in the labour market has been gradually declining
over the 20th century. For instance, in 1950 almost 60% of men age 65-69
partecipated in the labour force, while by 1990 this figure had fallen to 26%.
Otherwise, the percentage of workers covered by SS System has significantly
rose over the same period. There has been also a dramatic increase in the
share of the older population receiving payments from public schemes. Thus,
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it seems there would exist a strong linkage between SS System and incentive
to retirement. To verify this linkage he analysed the hazard rate, defined as
the increase in the rate of labour force leaving from the previous age, relative
to the stock of workers participating at the previous age. The trend, both
for males and females, shows the suggestive existence of two spikes around
age 62, the age of eligibility for early retirement under Social Security and
age 65, which is the legal retirement age. Trying to give an explanation
to this phenomenon, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin note that the Government
retirement ages have not risen with an augmented life expectancy and a
betterment in health, since we would expect the fraction of GDP devoted
to public programs for the old to increase less than one-for-one, because
the dead weight losses associated with SS taxes presumably increases with
respect to an increasing rate, while in the real world this ratio varies ex-
actly one-for-one with the fraction of the population over age 60. Secondly,
the Social Security have mostly pay-as-you-go features, which means that
an intergenerational transfer always exists. Identical results were achieved
by Ruzik [43], which analised the retirement bahaviour in Poland, Hungary
and Lithuania; the main result of her econometric analysis was that becom-
ing unemployed at an older age is a strong factor increasing probability of
retirement and that there exists a strong linkage between retirement and
the right to get a social security benefit in advanced age. Aguiar [1] tried
to go more in depth, analisying the allocation of time; he confirmed results
obtained by previous literature that time devoted to leisure has increased
significantly in the United States over the last five decades, but he made a
further effort to disaggregate uses of household time into specific categories,
namely market work time, non-market time and leisure time. Market work
time is represented by a core market work (main jobs, second jobs, overtime,
time spent working at home) plus time spent commuting to/from work and
time spent on ancillary work activities (i.e. eating a meal); the study shows
that this category has been remaining constant between 1965 and 2003, even
though with a difference between men and women. The non-market work
encompasses activities such as household activities (i.e. cleaning, ironing,
vacuuming), time spent obtaining goods and services (i.e. shopping) and
time spent on other home productions (i.e. gardening, vehicle repair). In
this case, time spent in these activities has fallen sharply over the same
period of time. Otherwise, leisure time, consisting in the residual of work
activities has been increased significantly. Huovinen and Piekkola [26], in
a study on early retirement and use of time by older Finns, argued that
factors related to labour demand, in addition to personal financial incen-
tives and health, are very important in determining the early retirement in
Finland and that changes in how leisure time is valued explain the level of
withdrawal from labour market. Finally Dorn & Sousa-Poza [13], analysing
early retirement in Switzerland, discovered that early retirement positively
depends on the level of wealth, the level of education, a negative attitude
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toward the job, preferences toward leisure and retirement incentives pro-
vided by firms. Thus, it seems that an high level of accumulated wealth
entails a higher probability to retire. Table 1 shows the dramatic decline
in the employment of older workers as a fraction of male population which
occurred in some OECD countries over the last five decades. Except Japan,
participation rates have been declining from above 80 percent to below 50
percent.
Table 1 - Employment of male workers at age 55 to 64 as a percentage of
male populations of the same age
1980 1990 1995 2000
Belgium 47.7 34.3 34.5 35, 1
Canada 71.3 60.3 53.7 57.7
France 65.3 43.0 38.4 38.5
Germany 64.1 52.0 48.2 48.2
Japan 82.2 80.4 80.8 78.4
United Kingdom 62.6 62.4 56.1 59.8
United States 69.7 65.2 63.6 65.6
Source: Fenge & Pestieau (2005)
5.1.1 Early Retirement: Free Choice or Forced Decision?
As we have demonstrated in the previous point, data referring to retirement
show a clear downward trend in labour market participation. Then, a nat-
ural question arises: do people voluntarily retire earlier or are they forced
to retire by labour market conditions? This question still has not found
a clear answer, since it would require a perfect knowledge about individ-
ual preferences for retirement which we do not actually have. Nevertheless,
find an answer to this question would be fundamental to understand how
workers react to a change in social security system, such as an increase in
the legal retirement age, the transition from a PAYG System to a Fully
Funded System or any other pension reform. The importance of being able
to answer this question is highlighted by the following example: imagine to
introduce a policy which aims to supply education to the elder workers; if
their preferences are such that they only desire to retire to enjoy more leisure
rather than to work, probably these measures would not be much effective;
otherwise, suppose retirements take place due to labour market reasons (i.e.
a negative economic trend which forces firms to incentive workers exodus,
bad perception the old have about their ability to go on performing a task,
and so on); in this case a good intervention by Governments in Social Se-
curity policies would stimulate workers to withdraw from earlier retirement.
Strange enough, the economic literature has not been focusing so much over
this issue. The main stream of literature on early-retirement believes that
to understand workers’ retirement decisions, we must focus on the labour-
supply side; the main evidence this theory achieved is that earlier and more
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generous availability of public old-age benefits (or more generous early retire-
ment regulations) tend to increase early exits from the labour market, since
early retirement becomes a more attractive choice for individuals. Thus,
labour-supply economists believe that early retirement is more a free choice
than a forced decision. Empirical evidence about the retirement incentives
(see Fenge & Pastieu [21], Coile & Gruber [10] and Gruber & Wise [23])
found that retirement incentives are strongly related to early retirement,
that most wealthy people, that is people who would have more opportuni-
ties to continue to work, are more likely to retire earlier, and that workers
are more likely to prefer retirement to work as they get old. Otherwise,
the labour-demand side perspective has not received the same attention and
only in the most recent years has gained interest among economists. In this
case, early retirement is seen more as a forced decision than a free choice.
5.1.2 Are preferences for leisure of the old higher than those of
the young?
In the model I assumed that the intrinsic preferences for leisure of the old
were higher than those of the young (ψτ−1 > ψτ ). This assumption is the
most difficult to verify, since it entails a complete knowledge about prefer-
ences of individuals which we do not actually have. Thus, this evaluation
must take place adopting indirect proxies. A study by McGrattan & Roger-
son [33] analysed changes in hours worked since 1950 for different cohorts.
They discovered that despite the average weekly hours worked per person
at the aggregate level has not substantially changed over the period and col-
lege enrollments over the monitored period increased, the number of weekly
hours worked by individuals aged 15-24 increased nearly 10 percent and the
number of hours worked by individuals aged 25-54 increased about 20 per-
cent; otherwise, hours worked by workers aged 55-64 fell 6.5 percent and
those of workers aged 65-74 fell 57 percent. Thus, it seems that U.S. labour
market has experimented a reallocation of hours worked among cohorts6.
This result seems to confirm our assumption: the young prefer to work, al-
though they have to invest in human capital while they are under 30, whilst
the old over 50 prefer to retire. Despite the classical motivations the lit-
erature has brought to explain this phenomenon, it seems there also exist
a “natural”tendency to retire soon after the middle age due to biological
reasons.
6monitoring disaggregate data among cohorts was essential to challenge the classical
theory by Prescott, who sustained looking at aggregate values that elasticity of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure was near 1
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5.1.3 How do retirees use their leisure?
In the model I assumed that the the old have a higher level of preference
for leisure than the young (ψτ−1 >> ψτ ) and I provided some theories
which may support this hypothesis. The empirical evidence seems to support
theoretical results. Huovinen and Piekkola suggest that leisure allocation is
a highly significant factor explaining retirement decisions and that not only
the overall increase in leisure makes retirement more attractive but also the
way this increased leisure is allocated. Results of the survey shown that
the share of more active activities is higher amongst the unemployed, while
passive activities (i.e. watching television, reading books and so on) are
higher amongst the employed. In my opinion, an interesting consideration
stated in this study is that the actively used leisure time works as a substitute
for decreased income to work.
5.2 Marginal Effective Federal Tax Rates in the US
Kotlikoff & Rapson [?] calculated the Marginal Effective Federal Tax Rates
on Working (Table 2 and 3). The analysis is conducted on two dimensions:
age and total income. Population is divided in three cohorts (young, middle
aged and senior) and in 7 levels of total income. Bold characters report
highest tax rates. It can be seen that it does not exist a cohort where tax
rates are sistematically higest; for instance, if we consider a single household,
we realize that for the lowest income levels senior people pay higest tax rates
(namely 29.8 per cent); otherwise, if we consider middle income levels we
find highest tax rates amongst the middle aged (33.8 per cent for an income
level equal to 15,000 and 47.7 per cent for an income level equal to 25,000),
or young (50.2 per cent for an income level equal to 35,000). Finally, if we
consider highest income levels marginal tax rates are higher for the old (36.5
per cent for an income level equal to 50,000 and 28.6 for an income level
equal to 100,000), with an exception represented by an income level equal
to 250,000 where the tax rate is higher for the young (41.5 per cent). Once
we consider a married household, situation changes. For the lowest income
levels middle aged and young people pay higest tax rates (41.4 per cent for
an income level equal to 20,000 and 33.7 per cent for an income level equal
to 30,000); otherwise, if we consider middle income levels we find highest
tax rates amongst the middle aged (28.2 per cent for an income level equal
to 50,000), or old (still 28.2 per cent for an income level equal to 50,000, 32.7
per cent for an income level equal to 70,000 and 34.3 per cent for an income
level equal to 100,000). Finally, considering highest income levels, not a
specific group seems to be taxed more: marginal tax rates are higher for the
old (37.5 per cent for an income level equal to 200,000), but the highest tax
rates are paid by both the young and the old, once if we consider an income
level equal to 500,000.
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Table 2 - Marginal Effective Federal Tax Rates on Working - Single
Households
Total Income (USD) Young (Age 30) Middle Aged (Age 45) Senior (Age 60)
10, 000 −23.1 −23.2 29.8
15, 000 33.3 33.8 22.4
25, 000 34.2 47.7 26.2
35, 000 50.2 28.3 29.0
50, 000 28.2 22.4 36.5
100, 000 27.6 27.5 28.6
250, 000 41.5 37.2 35.5
Source: Kotlikoff & Rapson (2006)
Table 3 - Marginal Effective Federal Tax Rates on Working - Married
Households
Total Income (USD) Young (Age 30) Middle Aged (Age 45) Senior (Age 60)
20, 000 33.8 41.4 23.5
30, 000 33.7 47.6 28.2
50, 000 28.0 28.2 28.2
70, 000 28.3 28.2 32.7
100, 000 33.5 33.7 34.3
200, 000 35.3 31.2 37.5
500, 000 38.4 38.4 37.2
Source: Kotlikoff & Rapson (2006)
This study seems to suggest two important conclusions: first of all, re-
sults of the theoretical model seems to hold in reality, at least for lowest
and middle level of income, where the highest percentage of population is
concentrated. Secondly, the fact that hightest tax rates are levied on the
old for highest levels of income seems to suggest the existance of a relations
between the parameter ψ is not exogenous but it is a monotonically increas-
ing function of income: ψ = ψ(y), where ∂ψ(y)∂y>0 . In this case, the richest the
individual, the highest the probability the individual is willing to substitute
work with leisure. In this case, he can even accept highest tax rates since
these discourages him to work, which is precisely what he desires.
5.3 The Political Economy of Early Retirement
The recent trend which refers to early retirement is something of unaccept-
able from a normative perspective. How can we justify policies which favor
early retirement, when due to demographical causes and financial troubles
the actual social security systems are universally considered unsustainable?
The normative theory states that in order to meet financial problems and
improvements in longevity the retirement age should be raised. Actually
answers to this dilemma should be found in the political economy. Accord-
ing to recent studies (see Jacobs and Shapiro [27], Ferrera [18], and Boeri,
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Borsch-Supan & Tabellini [7]) it seems that both in the U.S. and in Europe
the majority of people are against higher payroll taxes, lower benefits, and
a higher retirement age. Surveys show that European citizens are neither
happy with the existing programs nor willing to reform the welfare state.
Even though the evidence about the political economy of early retirement
seems to be clear and robust, we still lack of models which are able to ex-
plain the phenomenon. Even recent models (see Fenge & Pestieau [21]) seem
to suffer from misspecification problems; indeed, in the model of political
choice, individuals vote on a mandatory age of retirement, maximising a life-
time utility function where the age of retirement negatively affects the utility
of voters. This seems incorrect, because an higher retirement age increases
the monetary value of consumption; that is, consumption is a function of
time spent in working. Furthermore, consumption is a monetary variable
while the age of retirement is a time variable and, again, it seems quite in-
correct to sum a monetary variable with a time variable. Finally, the model
does not take into account the value of leisure, which is, in my opinion, the
key point to understand the political economy of early retirement. In fact,
an higher age of retirement increases the monetary value of total consump-
tion, but decreases the value of total leisure. To understand why voters seem
to be unwilling to increase the retirement age we have to find answers in
individual preferences. If we assume that working more means to have less
leisure, as it is obvious, then people do not accept to work more simply be-
cause the monetary value of the consumption due to an increase in working
time is lower than the monetary value of leisure. It is not the age of retire-
ment per se which reduces the individual’s utility but the reduced values of
total leisure which an increase in the retirement age produces, instead.
6 Conclusions
I introduced a political economy model which analysis the optimal taxation
problem when candidates are supposed to be voter-seekers which aim to
maximize the probability to win elections in a society characterized by dif-
ferent social groups. I derived the optimal taxation structure in a framework
characterized by overlapping generations; I demonstrated that the optimal
taxation on labour depends on the preferences of a group towards leisure,
which must be used as a proxy for the single-mindedness of that group. One
of the most interesting conclusion the model achieves states that eventually
the old receive a higher fiscal benefit than the young who have to pay higher
tax revenues. Finally, I demonstrated that, due to the features of fiscal sys-
tem and different preferences for leisure-work choice all the old either have
a low level of work or retire; this result is not only theoretical by also holds
in reality; the situation around the OECD countries shows that the retire-
ment age has increasingly reduced over the last decades and this is due to
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the generosity of social security services and the structure of fiscal systems.
Nevertheless, studies on the application of the SMT to the labour market
are at the very beginning and they open new interesting fields of research.
This model is far from being able to explain the relationship between social
groups’ behavior and labour market characteristics. For instance, it would
be interesting to analyse more in details the role of institutions, such as
labour unions or association of retirees on the political outcome; another
field of research could study the conflicts among unions and employers en-
dogenizing the bargaining power of the two social groups according to the
single mindedness theory’s assumptions. Finally, this model does not take
into account any issue which refers to savings; it would be useful to analyse
the effect of savings in different pensions schemes, such as the PAYG or the
Fully-Funded systems. I hope that these issues could be analyzed in future
works.
7 Acknowledgments
I am particularly grateful to Massimo Bordignon, Federico Etro, Torsten
Persson, Ronnie Razin, Jorgen Weibull, Micael Castanheira and Rachel Ngai
for the very helpful comments and Santino Piazza who introduced me in
the Latex and Mathematica world; to all the participants at the WISER
Conference in Warsaw, in particular to Maksymilian Kwiek and Anna Ruzik;
to DEFAP at the Universita’ Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Universita’ degli
Studi di Milano and Universita’ di Milano - Bicocca, for the financial support
and to the London School of Economics where the SMT was developed. All
the remaining errors are mine.
26
8 Appendix 1
In this Appendix I provide a complete resolution to the candidates’ problem. The two
candidates face exactly the same optimization problem; they maximize their share of votes
or, equivalently, the probability of winning. The resolution is made for candidate A, but
it also holds for candidate B.
max piA =
1
2
+
h
s
∑
I={T−1,T}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)]
T1 ≡ nτ−1τL(t− lτ−1t )(1− aτ−1t ) + nττL(t− lτt )(1− aτt ) = 0
I write the Lagrangian function:
L =
1
2
+
h
s
∑
I={T−1,T}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)] + λ (T1)
I obtain the following first order conditions which may be seen as a modified version of
the original Lindbeck and Weibull first order conditions:
(1) ∂L
∂aτ−1
t
≡ nτ−1 ∂sτ−1
∂lτ−1
t
∂lτ−1
t
∂aτ−1
t
(V τ−1A − V τ−1B) + nτ−1sτ−1( ∂V τ−1
∂aτ−1
t
) = λ ∂T (1)
∂aτ−1
t
(2) ∂L
∂aτ
t
≡ nτ ∂sτ
∂lτ
t
∂lτt
∂aτ
t
(V τA − V τB) + nτsτ ( ∂V τ
∂aτ
t
) = λ ∂T (1)
∂aτ
t
(3) T (1) = 0
According to the result stated in Corollary 1, FOC’s can be re-written in the following
manner:
(1) ∂L
∂aτ−1
t
≡ nτ−1sτ−1( ∂V τ−1
∂aτ−1
t
) = λ ∂T (1)
∂aτ−1
t
(2) ∂L
∂aτ
t
≡ nτsτ ( ∂V τ
∂aτ
t
) = λ ∂T (1)
∂aτ
t
(3) T (1) = 0
and after some easy calculations, I obtain:
(1) nτ−1sτ−1(tτL+ ψ
τ−1τL
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
)−λ( (1−a
τ−1
t
)τ2Lψ
τ−1nτ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
2 )−nτ−1τL(t− ψ
τ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
)) =
0
(2) nτsτ (tτL +
ψτ τL
(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
)− λ( (1−a
τ
t )τ
2
Lψ
τnτ
(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
2 − nττL(t− ψ
τ
(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
)) = 0
(3) T (1) = 0
From (1) and (2) obtain:
λ =
nτ−1sτ−1(t+ ψ
τ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
))
)
(
(1−aτ−1
t
)τLψ
τ−1nτ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
2 )− nτ−1(t− ψ
τ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
))
=
nτsτ (t+ ψ
τ
(1−(1−aτ
t
))
)
(
(1−aτ
t
)τLψ
τnτ
(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
2 − nτ (t− ψτ(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
))
Solving this system of equations analytically is a very difficult task. This is why I
performed some numerical simulations instead. In the following tables the main results
are reported. For computational purposes, I used a Logit Density Function as suggested
by Lindbeck and Weibull.
27
Table 4.a - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Input Matrix (τ = 0.7)
nτ−1 nτ τL t ψτ−1 ψτ e
ψτ−1
1+eψ
τ−1
eψ
τ
1+eψ
τ aτ−1t
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.689974 0.549834 1.06681
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.668188 0.574443 1.08073
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.71095 0.524979 imp
Table 4.b - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Output Matrix (τ = 0.7)
aτt l
τ−1
t l
τ
t T
τ−1
t T
τ
t
0.98701 0.764257 0.201835 −0.00317422 0.00317422
0.967677 0.662557 0.306945 −0.00670922 0.00670922
imp imp imp imp imp
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Table 5.a - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Input Matrix (τ = 0.8)
nτ−1 nτ τL t ψτ−1 ψτ e
ψτ−1
1+eψ
τ−1
eψ
τ
1+eψ
τ aτ−1t
0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.689974 0.549834 1.05846
0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.668188 0.574443 1.07064
0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.71095 0.524979 imp
Table 5.b - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Output Matrix (τ = 0.4)
aτt l
τ−1
t l
τ
t T
τ−1
t T
τ
t
0.988634 0.764257 0.201835 −0.00317422 0.00317422
0.971718 0.662557 0.306945 −0.00670922 0.00670922
imp imp imp imp imp
29
Table 6.a - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Input Matrix (τ = 0.9)
nτ−1 nτ τL t ψτ−1 ψτ sτ−1 sτ aτt
0.5 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.689974 0.549834 1.05277
0.5 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.668188 0.574443 5.61573
0.5 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.71095 0.524979 imp
Table 6.b - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Output Matrix (τ = 0.15)
aτ−1t l
τ−1
t l
τ
t T
τ−1
t T
τ
t
0.997595 0.76373 0.200434 −0.00323583 0.00323583
−2.08616 0.135813 −0.168772 −1.58728 1.48428
imp imp imp imp imp
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9 Appendix 2
Suppose that individuals’ preferences are represented by the following function:
Λ = U(c) + V (p) (26)
with U1, V1 > 0 and U11, V11 < 0 c represents a basket of market goods and p represents
the political activity non-market good, which is produced according to a CRTS production
function
p = H(l, d) = dH(
l
d
, 1) (27)
with H1, H2 > 0 and H11, H22 < 0. H is a standard function, d represents purchased
inputs to undertake political activities and l is time spend in political activities. The fixed
quantity of the worker input sells at the price c, again measured in terms of time. Suppose
now that the worker has a total amount of time T (which I normalize to the unity) he can
divide between working in the labour market for a market wage rate equal to w or using
to undertake political activities. Define the function:
X(l, d) = V (dH(
l
d
, 1)) (28)
Now, according to Paretian definitions, define l and p as complements when X12 > 0 and
substitutes when X12 > 0. the individual’s maximization problem is
7:
max
l
U(w(t− l)− cw) +X(l, d) (29)
First Order Conditions are given by:
V1(dH(
l
d
,1))H1(
l
d
,1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
X1(l, d) −wU1(w(t− l)− cw) = 0 (30)
First order conditions state that the gain due to an extra unit of time spent in political
activities (X1(l, d) > 0) is offset by the loss in terms of foregone utility in labour market
(wU1(w(t − l) − cw)). Thus if we suppose that inputs to perform political activities are
complements of time spent in these activities, we assist to an increase in leisure time
devoted to non-market work. An increase in time spend in political activities requires
a decrease in time spent in working. To evaluate whether l and d are complements or
substitutes we analyse the following expression:
marginalbenefitoftimespentinpoliticalactivity︷ ︸︸ ︷
X1(l, d) =
marginalutilityofpoliticalactivity︷ ︸︸ ︷
V1(dH(
l
d
, 1)) ×
marginalproductoftimespentinpoliticalactivity︷ ︸︸ ︷
H1(
l
d
, 1)
Notice that
∂V1(dH(
l
d
,1))
∂d
< 0, whilst
∂H1(
l
d
,1)
∂d
> 0. ThusX12 = −V11H21 ( ld )− V1H11 ld2 + V11HH1
which depends on whether the elasticity of the marginal product of labour with respect
to the time-goods ratio −( l
d
)H11
H1
is smaller or larger than the elasticity of marginal utility
with respect to the political activity −pV11
V1
, weighted by share of purchased inputs in
output,
d(H−H1l
d
)
p
.
Example 1
Suppose:
U(c) = γ ln(c)
7note the second order conditions entails w2U11 +X11 < 0
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V (p) = (1− γ) ln(p)
The “technology ”used by worker to produce the political activity exploits a CES pro-
duction function H(l, d) = (dρ + lρ)
1
ρ and the worker’s budget constraint is given by
c = w(t− l − c). Thus, the worker maximization problem can be written as:
max
l
γ lnw + γ ln(t− l − c) + (1− γ) ln(dρ + lρ) 1ρ
which entails the following first order conditions:
γ
1− γ =
t− l − c
dρ + lρ
lρ−1
which is independent from the wage rate, since the increased opportunity cost of the
political activity substitution effect is offset by the fact that higher wages make the worker
wealthier income effect.
Example 2 - Effects of labour income taxation
Take now the setup from Example 1 but now U(c) = ln(c− ς) and c = (1− τ)w(1− l) + t
where τ represents the labour income taxation and t a positive lump-sum transfer which
is a fraction θ of taxes collected by Government whose budget is g+ t = τw(t− l). Solving
the problem we obtain the following first order condition:
(1− τ)w
c− ς = 1
c = [1− τ(1− θ)]w(t− l)
and finally:
t− l = 1− τ
[1− τ(1− θ)] +
ς
w[1− τ(1− θ)]
Three case arise:
1. ς = 0 and θ = 0 ⇒ tax rate does not affect hours worked.
2. ς = 0 and θ = 1 ⇒ higher tax rates reduce hours worked since only substitution
effect holds.
3. ς > 0 and θ = 0 ⇒ higher tax rated increrase hours worked since the (negative)
income effect more than offset the (positive) substitution effect.
10 Appendix 3
In this Appendix I provide a complete resolution to a model with altruism. I write again
the problem that every candidate must solve:
max piA =
1
2
+
h
s
∑
I={T−1,T}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)]
T1 ≡ nτ−1τL(t− lτ−1t )(1− aτ−1t ) + nττL(t− lτt )(1− aτt ) = 0
I write the Lagrangian function:
L =
1
2
+
h
s
∑
I={T−1,T}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)] + λ (T1)
I obtain the new first order conditions:
(1) ∂L
∂aτ−1
t
≡ nτ−1 ∂sτ−1
∂lτ−1
t
∂lτ−1
t
∂aτ−1
t
(V τ−1A − V τ−1B) + nτ−1sτ−1( ∂V τ−1
∂aτ−1
t
) = λ ∂T (1)
∂aτ−1
t
32
(2) ∂L
∂aτ
t
≡ nτ ∂sτ
∂lτ
t
∂lτt
∂aτ
t
(V τA − V τB) + nτsτ ( ∂V τ
∂aτ
t
) + nτ−1sτ−1( ∂V
τ−1
∂aτ
t
) = λ ∂T (1)
∂aτ
t
(3) T (1) = 0
According to the result stated in Corollary 1, FOC’s can be re-written in the following
manner:
(1) ∂L
∂aτ−1
t
≡ nτ−1sτ−1( ∂V τ−1
∂aτ−1
t
) = λ ∂T (1)
∂aτ−1
t
(2) ∂L
∂aτ
t
≡ nτsτ ( ∂V τ
∂aτ
t
) + nτ−1sτ−1( ∂V
τ−1
∂aτ
t
) = λ ∂T (1)
∂aτ
t
(3) T (1) = 0
and after some easy calculations, I obtain:
(1) nτ−1sτ−1(tτL+ ψ
τ−1τL
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
)−λ( (1−a
τ−1
t
)τ2Lψ
τ−1nτ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
2 )−nτ−1τL(t− ψ
τ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
)) =
0
(2) (nτsτ+nτ−1sτ−1σ)(tτL+ ψ
τ τL
(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
)−λ( (1−a
τ
t )τ
2
Lψ
τnτ
(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
2 −nττL(t− ψ
τ
(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
)) = 0
(3) T (1) = 0
From (1) and (2) obtain:
λ =
nτ−1sτ−1(t+ ψ
τ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
))
)
(
(1−aτ−1
t
)τLψ
τ−1nτ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
2 )− nτ−1(t− ψ
τ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
))
=
(nτsτ + nτ−1sτ−1σ)(t+ ψ
τ
(1−(1−aτ
t
))
)
(
(1−aτ
t
)τLψ
τnτ
(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
2 − nτ (t− ψτ(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
))
Again I perform some numerical simulations:
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Table 7.a - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Input Matrix (σ = 0.5)
nτ−1 nτ τL t ψτ−1 ψτ e
ψτ−1
1+eψ
τ−1
eψ
τ
1+eψ
τ σ aτ−1t
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.689974 0.549834 0.5 0.968135
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.668188 0.574443 0.5 0.923797
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.71095 0.524979 0.5 imp
Table 7.b - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Output Matrix (σ = 0.5)
aτt l
τ−1
t l
τ
t T
τ−1
t T
τ
t
1.00372 0.818251 0.199481 0.000911713 −0.000911713
1.02025 0.739444 0.295807 0.00428223 −0.00428223
imp imp imp imp imp
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Table 8.a - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with
Mathematica 5.2 - Input Matrix (σ = 0.8)
nτ−1 nτ τL t ψτ−1 ψτ e
ψτ−1
1+eψτ−1
eψ
τ
1+eψ
τ σ aτ−1t
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.689974 0.549834 0.8 −0.264239
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.668188 0.574443 0.8 0.898665
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.71095 0.524979 0.8 imp
Table 8.b - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with
Mathematica 5.2 - Output Matrix (σ = 0.8)
aτt l
τ−1
t l
τ
t T
τ−1
t T
τ
t
35.0178 6.95456 0.00806047 −2.67905 −10.6196
1.02454 0.753445 0.294933 0.0051979 −0.0051979
imp imp imp imp imp
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FIGURE  1 
A scheme of Overlapping Generations Model 
 
 
FIGURE  2 
A Multi-dimensional Density Function where the Red group is more single-minded than the Orange 
for both issue x and y. 
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FIGURE  3 
Equilibrium in leisure activities 
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